be applied to resolve the hotly contested debate over human rationality. These theories have attracted considerable attention, mainly because they posit that human rationality involves two discrete forms of cognitive systems. Despite providing enlightenment for much of the contradictory information observed in reasoning and decision-making research, dual-process theories provide a viable reason to be hopeful about the prospects of human rationality.
The extent to which humans can accomplish the requirements of rationality models suggested by normative rationality theories has been a subject of significant debate, at least since the ground-breaking work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in 1974. It has been suggested that empirical studies have illustrated the irrational nature of humans. Strong arguments have, however, attempted to clarify the apparently menacing facts by illustrating that human decision-making and reasoning is not far from absolute rationality. Much of the rationality debate is a rejoinder to the outsized body of research has emerged after the initial studies by Tversky and Kahneman. The research has been considered by many as having depressing allusions for human rationality. Evolutionary philosophers have built up their own conceptual and empirical projects that seek to prove that humans are actually on the brink of optimal rationality. The two conflicting standpoints have bred huge amount of apparently clashing data (Manktelow & Man, 2004).
Recently, however, some researchers have put forward that dual-process theories of rationality, which propose the two discrete systems underlying human cognition, could provide an approach that can help make sense out of the two conflicting sides. However, although dual-process theories provide prospective resolution to the conflicts in the rationality debate, they presently lack substantial clarity regarding the exact definition of the theories themselves (Scholz, 2003). While some improvements have been made, still very little has been done in expounding the criteria concerned with the connection for the two cognitive processing systems contained in the dual-process theories. In addition, the explanation of how these systems operate to initiate behavior is still unclear.
The Great Rationality Debate
Human rationality has been an important notion throughout the history of psychology, as well as a number of other fields of research such as philosophy and economics. However, the proper conception of the issue has proved notoriously contentious. According to Edward Stein (1996), most researchers often adopt something he refers as the standard representation of rationality. His views about the standard representation of rationality propose that rationality implies the ability to reason and make choices that concur with the system of proper logic, decision theory, probability theory, and other related rational systems. His main assumption is that if this standard representation is accurate, reasoning ideologies that are founded on such systems are normative standards of reasoning, which are the three principles that ought to guide human reasoning (Stein, 1996).
Psychologists, from the early 1970s, started to empirically explore to what extent, or whether decisions made by humans actually concur with the principles of the normative systems. They dedicated their efforts to finding out the extent to which individuals could be deemed rational. Human rationality studies became a blooming area of psychological research, and suggestions were quickly acknowledged as prospective threat to conventional methodologies of philosophy (Styhre, 2013). Jonathan Cohen, a philosopher, diagnosed the hitch for philosophy by asserting that if the suggestions of psychologists were accurate, their claims would gravely disgrace intuition claims to offer reliable reasons for inductive reasoning in logical philosophy. His claims were based on the fact that analytical philosophy bases its reasoning accounts on the information on human intuition at many stages, thus necessitating the inclusion of this comprehensive literature into the meta-philosophy of analytical philosophy. As Jonathan explains it, the issue of rationality in humans is a topic of great concern in philosophy.
Apparently, philosophy would have to be greatly re-considered or abandoned if it lacked the element of rationality, owing to the practice of analytic tradition by many philosophers of the time. Jonathan and his colleagues quickly offered responses regarding this prospective threat. The rationality debate has largely revolved around the question of whether these arguments sufficiently secured the view of human rationality. These arguments have incorporated both empirical research and philosophical arguments within the realm of evolutionary psychology. Research on human rationality is normally envisioned in terms of three interlinked projects, each exploring the different levels of decision-making. The three projects are the normative, the descriptive, and the prescriptive projects (Paul & Linda, 2002). The rationality debate is based on two historically opposing positions, that is, the optimistic position of human rationality and the pessimistic stance of human rationality. The controversy is by and large about which among the two stances is correct. However, there could be a third option within the debate, which could be a neutral point of view that disregards the two stances.
Discussion
Modern-day psychologists base their research on several guiding assumptions. First, human reasoning and decision-making capacities may have evolved as adaptations to the difficulties faced by the earlier ancestors. Assuming this is the case, it implies that humans should perform considerably better than their ancestors on various difficulties they face requiring them to make logical decisions. The second assumption is that the aforementioned adaptations would develop as elements in the brain, designed through evolution to tackle area specific dilemmas. Based on these assumptions, modern psychologists like John Tooby, Leda Cosmides, and Gerd Gigerenzer have proposed that humans are actually good at accomplishing many principles of the normative theories provided that data is presented in a format that resembles the one presented to ancestors (Schinka, Irving, & Wayne, 2003).
It is rather difficult to draw conclusions from empirical data without the prior implementation of a theoretical scheme. Enthusiasts of behavioral economics make conclusions based on empirical evidence, that rationality of economic agents will be limited if they fail to maximize utility. This conclusion is, however, not drawn directly from empirical literature, but from the implementation of the neo-classical schools schema known as the Classical Theory of Rational Action. The rationality hypothesis became the basis of the arguments of neo-classical economists. It was even associated with the neo-classical economic model itself. However, much of the criticisms on this model have refuted the hypothesis that human behavior can be described in terms of maximization behavior (Paul & Linda, 2002). The association of human rationality with their maximizing behavior has been a topic of lengthy debates since the studies of Hitch and Hall established that entrepreneurs never make decisions on profit maximization grounds.
Herbert Simons work of the 1940s, together with that of Tversky and Kahneman of the 1970s mounted the dispute over the hypothesis of maximizing rule. The authors of these great works were motivated by the empirical outcome of cognitive psychology to disprove the pragmatism of the maximization rule, after which they proposed the idea of bounded rationality. This concept shed light on the whole field of Economics, which came to be referred as behavioral economics. It is often considered an alternative to the hegemony of neo-classical economics from an economics perspective. The major criticism on the maximizing rule by behavioral economists is its inaptness with empirical proofs (lamentowicz & Anna, 2005). It is from these empirical proofs that Simon and his supporters deduce that rationality is restricted because of the limitations of human cognitive capacities. The conclusion by Simon about the restricted nature of human rationality is not a unique and compulsory result of empirical evidence. The deductions made by behavioral economists regarding human behavior and rationality are drawn from an in-depth interpretation of empirical evidence founded on the same theoretical scheme about human reasoning adopted by the neo-classical model of rationality. The same experimental evidence could give a different conclusion concerning rationality in one interpreted it from a different perspective.
Neo-classical ideas of rationality are linked to the rule of maximizing a given objective under some form of limitations. The assumption is that the agent will choose the best when presented with various well-ordered alternatives. The selected alternative is the one that gives the agent maximum satisfaction with less sacrifice of the resources of acquiring. In this context, the scheme of preferences is inclusive and well-organized, and the agent is well informed about all other available alternatives. In addition, the agent has the ability to do any reckoning that may link the alternatives to the value allocated to uses. This applies to both firms and consumers within an economy, with the only difference being profit and utility respectively (Styhre, 2013).
The Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning
Recent research in reasoning and thinking suggest there are two discrete cognitive schemes underlying reasoning. However, this is not a new theory. It is most likely founded on William James dual process theory. The first cognitive system is old and shared with other animals. It consists of of self-governing subsystems that are guided by experience. The second is a more recent development that is distinctly human. The system facilitates abstract logic and theoretical reasoning, however, is limited by working memory capacity and individual intelligence. These theories claim that there are essentially two minds in one brain. Experimental psychosomatic evidence demonstrates that the two minds contend for control over an individuals actions and inferences (William, 1978).
Sometimes the two systems of reasoning are described as Implicit and Explicit. Implicit cognitive system is a universal cognition shared between humans and animals. The system comprise of subsystems that operate automatically. It includes innate behaviors that have an innate input module. The processes in this system are rapid and only the final product of the process is posted in the conscious part of the mind. Explicit cognition system is a more recent developed only in humans. The processes in this system are slow and follow systematic process utilizing the central working memory (William, 1978). Despite the limited aptitude and slower processing, the system sanctions hypothetical thinking. For example, it is possible for an individual make decisions based on construction of mental models of future possibilities. This distinctive facility is of uttermost importance in avoiding disasters that we cannot learn of by experience.
Studies conducted to establish the value of these theories use the deductive reasoning paradigm. One popular method of demonstrating dual processes is the belief-bias effect developed by Evan et al (1983). The experiment creates a divergence between responses based upon processes of logic reasoning and those resulting from former conviction about the truth. It is clear from the experiment that contributors are influenced by both the logic of an argument and the believability of the termination. According to the dual process the participants attempt to reason logically, however, the influence of prior beliefs efficiently contend for the responses made. Explicit thinking has the ability to suppress implicit thinking when emphasis are placed on logical reasoning. It is possible for an individual to suppress implicit thinking when a deliberate effort is made.
Explicit thinking requires a working memory thus vary across individuals. Recent series of studies conducted by Stanovich and West (2000) are consistent with this assertion. In the experiment, the participants are required to find normatively accurate answers to arrange of inferential and verdict making tasks. Those who performed high in this experiment also performed high in a cognitive ability test measured by SAT scores. Explicit thinking is more active in high ability individuals therefore, there can better resist contextualization of problems with earlier acquaintance and credence. The dual process theories also receive further support from experiments designed to map the development of reasoning in children. Explicit processes are more strongly linked than implicit processes to a childs age and measured astuteness. The findings are complemented by confirmation that explicit processes decline with age unlike implicit processes.
Most of the dual process theories are stimulated by delve into on reasoning; however, they are equally applicable to studies of decision-making and judgment. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1982) research in heuristics and biases emphasize the role short-cuts heuristics play in probability verdict and the consequential cognitive biases. Similar approaches were a precursor in the study of dual process hypothesis. Judgment researchers have reached the same conclusion reached by reasoning theorist; explicit effort could override unconscious biases. Some dual process include the Evans and Overs dual process theory, Slomans dual process theory, and Stanovich and Wests two system theory.
The dual process theories of reasoning and thinking propose that humans have two minds in one brain. However, most of the current theories are framed in general terms with no specific computational architecture (Stevenson, 1997). There are no models showing how the two systems interact in the brain. Such models could offer insight on how the conflict might be resulted in the control of behavior. There is no data detailing the extent to which voluntary process of the explicit process inhibit the strong tendencies of responding in judgment informed by the implicit process. The relation between implicit processes and working memory needs further elaboration, especially with the aim of determining how an understanding of implicit processes and executive processing can limit cognitive biases.
Some of the reasoning theorist contrast the claims made by the dual process theorists instead favoring a single system theory. One principal argument against dual process theory is that it does not lodge the variety of processes identified in studies of reasoning. According to Stevenson (1997), the criteria used to identify the two systems of reasoning does not lodge reasoning processes involving possession and function of simple and compound rules. Implicit reasoning involves the application of fragmentary knowledge where explicit reasoning generates organized representations that can combine with prior instances. The two are on extreme ends of a continuum and between them are representations of knowledge. The accuracy of the knowledge depends on the precision and significance to the current dilemma space.
Empirical Research on Rationality
Humans have been studying the decision making process for a few centuries now. The study has contributed in many fields including the mathematical bases for economics. Other areas the study is contributing in the modern world include military and cybernetics. Decision theories influence many other disciplines (Doyle and Thomason, 1999). Emerging theories in the discipline demand a multidisciplinary approach to comprehend them. For example, according to Kay (2002), to understanding the decision making process demands an understanding of human intuitions. Behavior and decisions are the main characters of the decision making because they engage human thoughts and response to the environment. This includes future possibilities and psychological consequences. The decision making process integrates peoples beliefs and individual reactions to specific events.
Decisions are retorts to situations and include three specific aspects. First, the decision maker may have to choose from more than one option. He or she forms expectation of future probabilities and the consequences associated with a particular outcome. This can be assessed by reflecting upon personal values and goals. The decision process not only integrates expectations with belief, but also breaks down the choice dilemma into small manageable problems that are easier to deal with. Finally, a reintegration mechanism facilitates the selection of a course of action. This model of alternative analysis demand that the decision making process be explicit and clear for ease of reviewing the analysis process to determine why a particular choice was selected (Keeney, 1982).
The decision making process is well studied; however, there are many areas of the decision making process that still remain. Most organizations decision making models do not include the cultural element in the decision making process. There are two groups of theories that propose discrete suppositions to explain the decision making practice. These include expressive and normative theories. Descriptive theories focus on how an individual reaches a decision whereas normative theories focus on how a decision maker should decide. Psychological theories have revealed fundamental principles that guide the decision making process (Doyle & Thomason, 1999). The theories suggest the existence of special mechanisms that people use to development information, and construe their surroundings. These mechanisms are subject to influence by beliefs and values. Rational theories explain how decision makers analyze different outcomes to reach a decision.
Conclusion
The rational decision-making processes use a weighing mechanism to maximize on the outcome. The theories emphasize the process of choosing rather than the choice. An important element that influences the decision-making process and is yet to be well understood is culture. Culture influences the way people think and make decisions. Each culture has its own set of basic assumption that manifest in the explicit reasoning process. Culture competence enables individual overcome natural barriers imposed by explicit reasoning because he or she is in a position to identify the underlying basic assumptions. Choice and behavior are the main elements in a decision making process. The duo process theories maintain the possibilities that human are rational despite the many counter arguments because of explicit reasoning.
References
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